resolves#8549
This PR add a config to enforce 2FA for the whole Forgejo instance. It can be configured to `none`, `admin` or `all`.
A user who is required to enable 2FA is like a disabled user. He can only see the `/user/settings/security`-Page to enable 2FA, this should be similar to a user which needs to change his password. Also api and git-commands are not allowed.
## Checklist
The [contributor guide](https://forgejo.org/docs/next/contributor/) contains information that will be helpful to first time contributors. There also are a few [conditions for merging Pull Requests in Forgejo repositories](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/governance/src/branch/main/PullRequestsAgreement.md). You are also welcome to join the [Forgejo development chatroom](https://matrix.to/#/#forgejo-development:matrix.org).
### Tests
- I added test coverage for Go changes...
- [x] in their respective `*_test.go` for unit tests.
- [x] in the `tests/integration` directory if it involves interactions with a live Forgejo server.
- I added test coverage for JavaScript changes...
- [ ] in `web_src/js/*.test.js` if it can be unit tested.
- [ ] in `tests/e2e/*.test.e2e.js` if it requires interactions with a live Forgejo server (see also the [developer guide for JavaScript testing](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/src/branch/forgejo/tests/e2e/README.md#end-to-end-tests)).
### Documentation
- [ ] I created a pull request [to the documentation](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/docs) to explain to Forgejo users how to use this change.
- [ ] I did not document these changes and I do not expect someone else to do it.
I will do it, if the general idea of this PR is a good feature.
### Release notes
- [ ] I do not want this change to show in the release notes.
- [x] I want the title to show in the release notes with a link to this pull request.
- [ ] I want the content of the `release-notes/<pull request number>.md` to be be used for the release notes instead of the title.
<!--start release-notes-assistant-->
## Release notes
<!--URL:https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo-->
- Security features
- [PR](https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/8753): <!--number 8753 --><!--line 0 --><!--description R2xvYmFsIDJGQSBlbmZvcmNlbWVudA==-->Global 2FA enforcement<!--description-->
<!--end release-notes-assistant-->
Co-authored-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/8753
Reviewed-by: 0ko <0ko@noreply.codeberg.org>
Reviewed-by: Ellen Εμιλία Άννα Zscheile <fogti@noreply.codeberg.org>
Reviewed-by: Gusted <gusted@noreply.codeberg.org>
Co-authored-by: zokki <zokki.softwareschmiede@gmail.com>
Co-committed-by: zokki <zokki.softwareschmiede@gmail.com>
Fix a minor UI bug introduced in https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/6112.
The condition `if .EnableInternalSignIn` was added to display of the divider, but it is only available when `oauth_container.tmpl` is called from signIn page, it is not relevant to signUp page.
Reviewed-on: https://codeberg.org/forgejo/forgejo/pulls/6463
Reviewed-by: Earl Warren <earl-warren@noreply.codeberg.org>
Setting ENABLE_INTERNAL_SIGNIN to false will disable the built-in
signin form, should the administrator prefer to limit users to SSO.
Continuation of forgejo/forgejo#6076
Clarify when "string" should be used (and be escaped), and when
"template.HTML" should be used (no need to escape)
And help PRs like #29059 , to render the error messages correctly.
(cherry picked from commit f3eb835886031df7a562abc123c3f6011c81eca8)
Conflicts:
modules/web/middleware/binding.go
routers/web/feed/convert.go
tests/integration/branches_test.go
tests/integration/repo_branch_test.go
trivial context conflicts
Closes#27455
> The mechanism responsible for long-term authentication (the 'remember
me' cookie) uses a weak construction technique. It will hash the user's
hashed password and the rands value; it will then call the secure cookie
code, which will encrypt the user's name with the computed hash. If one
were able to dump the database, they could extract those two values to
rebuild that cookie and impersonate a user. That vulnerability exists
from the date the dump was obtained until a user changed their password.
>
> To fix this security issue, the cookie could be created and verified
using a different technique such as the one explained at
https://paragonie.com/blog/2015/04/secure-authentication-php-with-long-term-persistence#secure-remember-me-cookies.
The PR removes the now obsolete setting `COOKIE_USERNAME`.
Change all license headers to comply with REUSE specification.
Fix#16132
Co-authored-by: flynnnnnnnnnn <flynnnnnnnnnn@github>
Co-authored-by: John Olheiser <john.olheiser@gmail.com>
